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CHAPTER 18 
Workmen's Compensation 
MACEY J. GOLDMAN 
§18.I. General. During the 1965 SURVEY year the workmen's com-
pensation legislation enacted by the General Court has had very little 
effect on the current status of workmen's compensation law in the Com-
monwealth. And, while the decisions emanating from the courts have 
had a greater importance than has the legislation, none of the cases 
produced any startling twists to the existing state of the law. 
§18.2. Status as an employee: Minors. Probably. the most signifi-
cant workmen's compensation case was Garnhum's Case,1 which dealt 
with a very interesting problem of double compensation to minors 
under General Laws, Chapter 152, Section 28. Section 28 provides that 
an injured employee whose injuries are sustained as a result of serious 
and willful misconduct on the part of an employer may receive double 
compensation for his injuries. The statute does not enumerate the types 
of situations to which this section applies except that it does provide 
that the "employment of any minor, known to be such, in violation" of 
the workmen's compensation statute, constitutes serious and willful mis-
conduct under the section. The Superior Court awarded double com-
pensation to the claimant, in accordance with the decision of the re-
viewing board which adopted the findings and decision of a single 
member. 
The claimant applied for a summer job with the defendant employer. 
In filling out the requisite applications, he stated his age to be over 16, 
when in fact he was under 16. He also told an interviewer that he was 
going on 17. This information was not verified by the employer. A few 
days after he started working, the claimant was injured while operating 
a machine. A claim for workmen's compensation was filed, coupled with 
a request for double compensation. 
Two aspects of the statute which provide for this double compensa-
tion should be noted. The employer is liable for double damages only 
if he knows that the employee has not yet reached majority. If he has 
this knowledge, it is his responsibility to make absolutely certain that 
the employee has reached the minimum age to do the job to which he 
is assigned. General Laws, Chapter 149, Section 60, places limitations 
upon the work that may be performed by those under 18. 
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On the procedural aspects of double compensation, the employer has 
the right to contest the award without consent of the compensation 
carrier, as he must reimburse his insurer for that portion of the award 
that represents the double compensation. It is under this statutory pro-
vision that the employer in the present case had appealed the Superior 
Court award. 
The employer raised three defenses. First, the employee should be 
barred from recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act because 
his contract of employment was void and, therefore, he was not in fact 
an employee. The Supreme Judicial Court, in Justice Spiegel's cogent 
opinion, easily disposed of this argument by holding that General Laws, 
Chapter 152, Section 28, by implication specifically applies to unlaw-
fully employed minors holding them to be employees and thus entitled 
to protection under the statute. Indeed, as the Court pointed out, the 
protection of minor employees was one of the prime purposes for the 
passage of this section of the statute. 
As the basis for his argument, the employer contended that by award-
ing compensation the Court would be enforcing a contract that was 
void. To support his argument, the employer might have cited several 
old cases that so held. But these decisions were made in order to protect 
employees. Employees were thus permitted to avoid the limitations on 
recovery imposed by the early workmen's compensation laws and could 
instead bring their action at common law. But as the statutory benefits 
were enlarged, it became more beneficial for even minor employees to 
bring their actions under the statute. As a result, it was necessary for 
the courts to subtly reverse their prior decisions, which may very well 
have been unsound in the first place. What the courts are now doing is 
to find these employment contracts not illegal, but at the same time 
holding that the action of an employer in hiring an underaged em-. 
ployee is illegal. At worst, .this is a voidable contract and voidable by 
the employee and not by the illegally acting employer. For example, 
the employer could not refuse to pay wages after work had been per-
formed by the employee. To refuse the award of double compensation 
on the ground here suggested by the employer would be to penalize the 
employee for the wrongful acts of the employer. Finally, it would be 
absurd to negate the very words of the workmen's compensation statute 
by straining the interpretations of the provisions of the parent statute.2 
This sterling example of logical reasoning evidenced by the Supreme 
Judicial Court is founded on a solid basis. Massachusetts has long held 
that an employee who works under the age limit is not working illegally 
unless the statute so provides. Thus his contract of employment cannot 
be said to be void.8 
As his second defense, the employer contended that the employee's 
misrepresentation of his age was serious and willful misconduct, thereby 
disqualifying him for compensation under Section 27 of General Laws, 
2 G.L., c. 149, §60. See 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation §§47.52(a)-(b) (1964). 
8 Pierce's Case. 267 Mass. 208. 166 N.E. 636 (1929). 
2
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1965 [1965], Art. 21
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1965/iss1/21
270 1965 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §18.2 
Chapter 152. This argument is invalid. To bar a claimant from his 
rights under this section of the statute, the employee's actions must have 
been both serious and willful. Serious refers to the conduct itself, and 
not to the consequences that might eventually flow from this conduct. 
Willful implies an intent to do a wrongful act or such recklessness as 
might be considered the equivalent of intent.4 
The employer's contention in this case merits as little consideration 
as did one farfetched argument based on similar grounds in the Cali-
fornia case of Brooklyn Mining Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,!> 
wherein it was claimed that the employee had participated in serious 
and willful misconduct. As a minor, he had stopped for a moment's 
rest on an extremely hot day after coming up from the interior of a 
mine, rather than going directly to his new assignment. While resting, 
he was injured. The results of the litigation should be obvious.6 
The present case does raise a serious question of long standing. 
namely, should the defense of willful and serious misconduct even be 
enumerated in the statutes? The overwhelming majority of cases de-
cided under this provision have found no willful and serious miscon-
duct had existed. At the same time, employers have raised the defense 
in almost any situation in which they seem to lack any better argument, 
with the resulting additional litigation and time-consuming procedures. 
The defense has successfully been raised only in those cases in which an 
employee has violated safety regulations. Would it not be more advis-
able to eliminate the almost-never-applied broad statute and replace it 
with one that is very specific, and yet one that would have practical 
meaning in light of court decisions? That is, should not the statute sim-
ply state that the employee is barred from recovery when he has seri-
ously and willfully violated safety regulations? Of course, even in this 
area, there is room for interpretation. If the safety regulation is not gen-
erally adhered to by all employees and if the disobedience of the regula-
tion is condoned by the employer, then should compensation be denied? 
In his final argument in Garnhum's Case the employer contended 
that recovery should be denied as a matter of public policy in order to 
discourage employees from lying about their age. No one would take 
issue with the employer's contention that this would be desirable. But 
the Court pointed out that the public policy as stated in General Laws, 
Chapter 149, Sections 86 and 95, must, because they are provided for 
by statute, take precedence over any other public policies. The greater 
public policy, imposed by statute, is to encourage employers when 
hiring minor employees to make every effort to ascertain the prospec-
tive employee's correct age, thereby protecting the minor employee 
"from employment in hazardous jobs." The burden for accuracy is thus 
placed on the employer. 
4 Scaia's Case, 320 Mass. 432, 69 N.E.2d 567 (1946). See also Thayer's Case, 345 
Mass. 36, 185 N.E.2d 292 (1962), noted in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §19.2, and 
Dillon's Case, 324 Mass. 102, 85 N.E.2d 69 (1949). 
Ii 172 Cal. 774, 159 Pac. 162 (1916). 
6 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation §32.20 (1964). 
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While all of the defenses raised by the employer in Garnhum were 
very weak and have been disposed of many times in related cases both 
in Massachusetts and other jurisdictions, this was a welcomed case. It 
clarified the law involving an often occurring fact pattern, the case in 
which an employee misrepresents his age and is subsequently hired and 
then injured while on the job, raising the possibility that this employee 
may be entitled to double compensation. 
§18.3. Status as an employee: Business trustee. A more justifiable 
argument, that the claimant was not an employee, was at issue in 
Hayes's Case.1 In this case the claimant was employed by a business 
trust. The trust owned and operated a duck farm. The claimant was 
the principal stockholder of the trust, had exclusive control over the 
trust, and complete control over the management of the farm. For his 
work on the farm, he received an annual wage of $10,000. 
The trust employed about 80 workers, all of whom were covered by 
workmen's compensation insurance. The claimant had been informed 
by the insurer's agent that he personally was covered by workmen's 
compensation and that the premium being paid by the trust reflected 
his coverage. 
Nevertheless, the Superior Court held that the claimant could not 
recover for his medical expenses under the workmen's compensation 
act, as he was not an employee as defined by General Laws, Chapter 152, 
Section 1. He was, in effect, an employer, regardless of his formal status. 
Following the precedent set in Ryder's Case,2 the Supreme Judicial 
Court was left with no alternative but to affirm the present case. In 
Ryder's Case the claimant, along with his son, was a trustee of a family 
business trust. Prior to the formation of the trust, the claimant had 
worked for his son as a carpenter and he continued to do so after the 
establishment of the trust. He was paid $50 a week and took no part 
in the management of the business. Nevertheless, the Supreme Judicial 
Court found that he was not an employee working in the service of 
another since, as a participant in the trust, he was working for himself. 
The trust agreement did not create an entity separate from the claim-
ant. 
Hayes, in the case at hand, contended that his case could be distin-
guished from Ryder. In the trust agreement involved in Ryder the 
stocks were not transferable whereas in the present case they were, with 
the result that there existed in effect an entity very close in fact to a 
corporation. The Court struck down this argument, noting that while 
there was some similarity between business trusts and corporations, 
they had not generally been treated as the same by the Massachusetts 
courts.s Whether the Court was correct in drawing such a distinction in 
§18.3. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 187, 204 N.E.2d 277. 
2341 Mass. 661, 171 N.E.2d 475 (1961), noted in 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§§5.5, 17.3. 
B United States v. Griswold, 124 F.2d 599 (1st Cir. 1941); Swartz v. Sher, 344 Mass. 
636, 184 N.E.2d 51 (1962); Griswold v. Director of the Division of Employment 
Security, 315 Mass. 371, 53 N.E.2d 108 (1944); State Street Trust Co. v. Hall, 311 
Mass. 299, 41 N.E.2d 30 (1942). 
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this case or in any other case is another matter. The crux of the prob-
lem is, would it and should it make any difference whether, for work-
men's compensation purposes, these trusts are treated as are corpora-
tions? 
Early compensation cases refused to make awards to corporate officers 
on the grounds that the benefits of the workmen's compensation statute 
were to be awarded workmen and not business executives.4 This distinc-
tion between blue collar and white collar workers was soon over-
shadowed, however, by the dual capacity rule. The courts readily 
realized that, particularly in smaller corporations, executives often 
performed duties that generally might be left to so-called workers. With 
this fact in mind, the courts held that if the employee-corporate officer 
was injured while performing those tasks ordinarily left to "workmen," 
he would be protected. 
But, as so often happens, the exception began to swallow the rule. 
With the enlargement of the exception, this, too, became an area for 
confusion. Another arbitrary distinction had to be drawn, between 
those duties which were executive and those which were labor. As more 
and more cases were heard, the distinguishing line became more and 
more arbitrary. I! To eliminate confusion, several states amended their 
workmen's compensation statutes specifically to include corporate em-
ployees. Other states did so by judicial decision.6 
Massachusetts, in Emery's Case,7 in effect adopted the dual capacity 
doctrine, finding that when a corporate officer was injured while per-
forming workmen's services, he was covered by workmen's compensa-
tion. There is no indication that the Massachusetts Court would go 
beyond this case and eliminate the dual capacity doctrine. Even if the 
dual capacity doctrine is in force, if the business trust is to be likened to 
the corporation, then in Hayes's Case the claimant would still be en-
titled to workmen's compensation coverage. For presumably good rea-
son, there are numerous distinctions between the business trust and the 
corporation. But for the purposes of the workmen's compensation stat-
utes, which by legislative edict and by judicial tradition are to be 
liberally construed, should they not be treated as the same? 
Our original thesis, however, was that such an analogy need not even 
be drawn. Any employee of any entity should be protected by work-
men's compensation. Is this not the intent of the legislation? But, ac-
cording to the Supreme Judicial Court, the answer is apparently no. 
Should the legislature wish for such protection to be so extended to 
business trusts, they will have to so specify in legislation. "If there is 
practical reason for treating managing trustees of such business trusts as 
41 Larson, Workmen's Compensation §54.20 (1964). 
I! Gottlieb v. Arrow Door Co., S64 Mich. 450, llO N.W.2d 767 (1961), 28 NACCA 
L.J. SS2. 
6 Mine Service Co. v. Green, 265 S.W.2d 944 (Ky. 1954), 14 NACCA L.J. 127; 
Fruit Boat Market v. Industrial Commission, 264 Wis. SM, 58 N.W.2d 689 (195S). 
7271 Mass. 46, 170 N.E. 8S9 (19S0). 
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employees for purposes of workmen's compensation ... we think that 
this is a matter for the legislature to consider."8 
The claimant contended that the insurer was estopped from asserting 
the defense that the claimant is not an employee. An agent of the in-
surer informed him that he was considered an employee and assessed 
the insurance premium on this assumption. But the Court held that 
estoppel cannot be claimed. To allow the estoppel would permit the 
Industrial Accident Board to go beyond their statutory powers and 
adjudicate the rights of one who is not an employee and thus one over 
whom the Board has no jurisdiction. If it is determined by the law that 
there is no employee involved in a case before the Board, no matter 
what other considerations there might be, the Board does not have 
jurisdiction. If there is any question as to this fact, they must make a 
decision despite the claim of an estoppe1.9 
While the Court finds many cases from foreign jurisdictions to sup-
port their decision,lO it would seem the better view is taken by the 
Rhode Island court when they went right to the merits of whether an 
estoppel would be applied in a case analogous on its facts to Hayes'S. 
They were not concerned with the administrative board's jurisdiction, 
for it would seem, if equity demands and equitable principles are the 
guidelines for workmen's compensation, the claimant should prevail.11 
§18.4. Status as an employee: Independent contractors. Adhering 
to the long-established criteria for determining whether a person is an 
employee or an independent contractor, the Court in Brigham's Case1 
failed to find error in the Review Board's determination that the claim-
ant was an employee of the Prudential Life Insurance Company. 
The test used by the Court was the so-called right to control test, 
wherein the trier of facts must decide whether the employer had a right 
to control the details of the claimant's methods of carrying out his re-
sponsibilities, thus classifying him as an employee of the employer. "If 
in the performance of his work, an individual is at all times bound to 
obedience and subject to direction and supervision as to details, he is 
an employee; but if he is only responsible for the accomplishment of 
8 The Court cited to the following five cases in support of its statement that this 
claimant should not be covered: Cohen v. Best Made Mfg. Co., 92 R.I. 389, 169 A.2d 
10 (1961); Duvick v. Industrial Commission, 22 Wis. 2d 155, 125 N.W.2d 356 (1963). 
But see Queen City Furniture Co. v. Hinds, 274 Ala. 584, 150 So. 2d 706 (1963); 
Hirsch v. Hirsch Bros., 97 N.H. 480, 92 A.2d 402 (1952). Compare Mahoney v. 
Nitroform Co., 20 N.J. 499, 120 A.2d 454 (1956). 
9 Perkins's Case, 278 Mass. 294, 180 N.E. 142 (1932); Levangie's Case, 228 Mass. 213, 
117 N.E. 200 (1917). 
10 Soars v. Soars-Lovelace, Inc., 346 Mo. 710, 142 S.W.2d 866 (1940); Nagy v. Ford 
Motor Co., 6 N.J. 341, 78 A.2d 709 (1951); Chadwick v. North Carolina Dept. of 
Conservation & Development, 219 N.C. 766, 14 S.E.2d 842 (1941); Superior Insurance 
Co. v. Kling, 160 Tex. 155, 268 S.W.2d 198 (1954). 
11 Davies v. Stillman White Foundry Co., 91 R.I. 337, 163 A.2d 44 (1960). 
§18.4. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1289, 202 N.E.2d 597. 
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an agreed result in an agreed manner, he is an independent contractor. 
The essence of the distinction is the right to control."2 
In the case under review, the claimant had a contract with Pruden-
tial, which stated that he was to devote substantially all his working 
time to the company's business, and was to render to policyholders all 
services incidental to the maintenance and care of the company's busi-
ness which may be required by the policyholders or by the company. 
The claimant collected premiums on policies he had sold for the com-
pany and also collected premiums on policies sold by others. He was 
required to attend weekly meetings and classes and to make daily tele-
phone calls or personal visits to his division manager's office. Addition-
ally, the manager could accompany him on visits to clients and had the 
right to approve or disapprove his weekly work schedule. His license 
to sell insurance was apparently contingent upon his relationship with 
Prudential. The parent company also provided him with secretarial 
assistance and office space. Certainly, under the most narrow interpreta-
tion of the right to control doctrine, this claimant would qualify as an 
employee. There can be little argument with the Court's decision up-
holding the Board's findings. 
However, while Larson in his treatise agrees that the right to control 
test predominates in determining whether a claimant should recover 
under workmen's compensation, he suggests that the trend is away 
from this test to the more modem test, relative nature of work.8 This 
test would find that a claimant is an employee for purposes of work-
men's compensation if the work he was performing was an integral part 
of the regular business of the employer, and if the employee, rela-
tive to the employer, is not involved in an independent business. That 
is, if the employee plays an integral part in the employer's business, as 
is the case with an insurance company's salesman, and if the employee 
is not involved in a separate enterprise or business, as would be the 
case if the salesman worked for an independent insurance agency, then 
he should be covered by workmen's compensation even if the employer 
retains minimum control over the activities of the employee. 
Preference for this latter test is based on sound rationale. The "con-
trol test" stems from the common law, under which it was used to deter-
mine whether an employer had responsibility to a third party for the 
negligent or wrongful acts of an employee. The question often was, as 
it is in workmen's compensation litigation, was the working party an 
employee or an independent contractor? If the former, then the em-
ployer would have financial responsibility for the third party's injuries. 
With some logic, the courts found that if the employer had control he 
could be found responsible, but if he had no control then he should not 
be responsible. From this evolved the concept that a person was in fact 
an employee if there was control. But the purposes of the workmen's 
21964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1289, 1290, 202 N.E.2d 597, 598. See Hartman's Case, 336 
Mass. 508, 510, 146 N.E.2d 509, 510 (1957); McDermott's Case, 283 Mass. 74, 75-77, 
186 N.E. 231, 232 (1933). 
81 Larson, Workmen's Compensation §43,42 (1964). 
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compensation statutes are far different from the questions involved in 
this common law litigation. The object in workmen's compensation is 
not to find responsibility of one party to another party for the wrong-
ful or negligent acts of yet a third party; it is concerned with restitution 
for injuries sustained by that third party. Control really has no relation-
ship to the basic tenets of the statutes. The important question is, in 
effect, whether the injured person is working for the employer, without 
paying homage to the technicalities of the relationship.4 Under modern 
business practices large businesses are distributing their workload to 
so-called independent contractors, people who in effect work for the 
contracting company but maintain some modicum of resemblance to a 
separate entity. Many of these people perform functions in areas at 
which workmen's compensation legislation is aimed. If the purposes of 
this benevolent legislation are not to be defeated, must not some new 
test other than control be devised? 
The second criteria for employee status under the relevance of work 
test must not be ignored. The basic philosophy of compensation legis-
lation "is that the cost of all industrial accidents should be borne by 
the consumer as a part of the cost of the product."5 If no separate prod-
uct or service evolves from the acts of the employee in question, and if 
his actions play an integral part in the employer's business, then upon 
whom is the burden for this employee's compensation to fall? Is it fair 
that he bear the burden himself because he failed to meet some tech-
nical criteria, when in fact he is, for all practical purposes, an employee? 
On the other hand, if he is the producer of an independent product or 
service, even though he plays an integral part in the employer's busi-
ness, he should have coverage from the prime product or service to 
which he is connected and not from an employer with whom he has 
little actual affiliation. This should be so even if a claim of some tech-
nical relationship between the claimant and the employer can be 
sustained. 
But can it not be argued that we are again dealing merely in polem-
ics? In practice would not any person who is not involved in an inde-
pendent business, and is playing an integral part in the activities of 
another business, be under control of that business? Not necessarily. 
Take the facts of Gordon v. New York Life Insurance CO.,6 as outlined 
by Larson.7 In this case we also have an insurance salesman. Under the 
written contract, she was free to exercise her own discretion and judg-
ment with respect to persons from whom she would solicit applications 
and with respect to the time, place, and manner of her solicitation of 
them. She was paid by commission, she paid for her own expenses, she 
was not required to attend meetings or classes or the like, nor did she 
report to anyone on her activities, except as to policies sold, and she 
had no office space. Her contract of employment indicated in specific 
4 Ibid. 
5Id. at §45.l0. 
6300 N.Y. 652, 90 N.E.2d 898 (1950). 
71 Larson, Workmen's Compensation §43.54 (1964). 
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terms that she was an independent contractor. Yet, after a stormy his-
tory, the New York Court of Appeals sustained the compensation 
board's determination that she was an employee for the purposes of 
workmen's compensation coverage. The New York court did not state 
they were changing New York's right of control test but, in effect, they 
had apparently done so. Be that as it may, this is the perfect example of 
the case in which a person may not be under the control of the em-
ployer, and yet may be performing a task intimately connected with the 
employer's business and is not producing an independent product or 
service.8 
§18.5. Course of employment. Massachusetts is one of the few 
states that does not require an accident for recovery under the work-
men's compensation statutes, providing that the injury arose out of the 
employment and occurred in the course of the employment. Whether 
an injury has arisen out of and occurred during the course of employ-
ment is a question that is often litigated and is the basic question in 
Uberto v. Kaufman.1 Breaking down the actual question in this case, 
the Supreme Judicial Court was faced with the problem of determining 
whether the expert witness who testified to the effect that the claimant's 
injuries were work connected was qualified to so testify. If so, was his 
testimony properly brought before the trial court? This is not a work-
men's compensation issue, but the case as a whole does focus attention 
on the interesting area of what can be termed occupational heart dis-
ease. Most state courts have been confronted with the situation in which 
an employee suffers a heart attack after performing some unusually 
difficult task or by the even more controversial situation in which an 
employee in the course of his regular work suffers heart failure which 
can in some way be attributed only to the general strain of his employ-
ment. The basic question in most states is, was the heart attack an acci-
dent? Because Massachusetts does not have the accident requirement, 
the problem would appear to be that much easier. In reality, it is not. 
The real question in all jurisdictions is one of medical causation.2 No 
matter what the test for awarding compensation, the damage must be 
work connected; i.e., it must be shown that the injury was medically 
related to the work. 
Massachusetts has not been known for handing out awards in heart 
8 For general discussions on this topic, see Hollingsworth &: Frazier v. Barnett, 
226 Ark. 54, 287 S.W.2d 888 (1956); Yarnty Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident 
Commission, 137 Cal. App. 2d 691, 290 P.2d 920 (1955); Industrial Commission v. 
Valley Chip &: Supply Co., 133 Colo. 258, 293 P.2d 972 (1956); Aetna Casualty &: 
Surety Co. v. Daniel, 80 Ga. App. 383, 55 S.E.2d 854 (1949); Brewer v. Millich, 276 
S.W.2d 12 (Ky. App. 1955); Lowell Daily Leader v. James, 224 Miss. 654, 80 So. 2d 
770 (1955); Bemis v. Friedman, 1 App. Div. 2d 860, 148 N.Y.S.2d 740 (3d Dept. 1956); 
Potash v. Bonaccurso, 179 Pa. Super. 582, 117 A.2d 803 (1955); Barker v. Curtis, 199 
Tenn. 41l1, 287 S.W.2d 411 (1956); Standard Insurance Co. v. McKee, 146 Tex. 183, 205 
S.W.2d 362 (1947); 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation §§43.00~45.32(d) (1964); 2 
NACCA L.J. lI8. 
§18.5. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. Il129, 202 N.E.2d 822. 
21 Larson, Workmen's Compensation §lI8.8l1 (1964). 
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attack cases merely because they happened on the job.s Yet the Court 
did not seem to have any trouble in the Uberto case in finding the 
causal connection. Once the causal connection requirement is satisfied, 
the arising-out-of criteria has been met, for if the injury were con-
nected to the job, then it arose out of the job. 
In Uberto, there was no question that the accident occurred in the 
course of employment. The claimant was a fifty-five-year-old worker 
who on the day of the heart attack arrived at work apparently feeling 
perfectly well. The employee performed various chores and then moved 
a large sack of paper weighing approximately ninety pounds. Immedi-
ately thereafter, he suffered pain in his lower breast bone and appar-
ently fell to the ground. He was hospitalized for several months, and at 
the time of the hearing, was still undergoing treatment. 
While the basic question in the area of what might be termed occu-
pational heart disease, i.e., whether it arose out of the employment, is 
not really raised in this case, it is a very interesting facet of workmen's 
compensation law. Many studies have been made on the question, and 
many cases involving this topic have been litigated. Despite the vari-
ance between Massachusetts treatment of the subject and the general 
practice, this material becomes relevant for the Massachusetts practi-
tioner as it must be remembered that the central concern, despite the 
literal wording of the opinions, is that of medical causation, something 
very important in Massachusetts cases.4 
§18.6. Recovery by the insurer. Under General Laws, Chapter 152, 
Section 15, an insurer who has paid workmen's compensation to an 
injured party may bring an action at law against a third party who 
might have been responsible for the worker's injuries. Damages recov-
erable are the same as they would be in any common law action. The 
right to bring such an action, however, is limited to parties other than 
the insured. 
S Herlihy's Case, 267 Mass. 232, 166 N.E. 556 (1929). And see 1 Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation §38.83 (1964). 
4 Two articles on occupational heart disease may be found at 14 Clev.-Mar. L. 
Rev. 322 (1965) and 37 U. Colo. L. Rev. 205 (1965). There have been several cases 
decided on this question. The most recent include: Geurian v. Kansas City Power 
&: Light Co., 192 Kan. 589, 389 P.2d 782 (1964),7 NACCA News L. 176, 274 (July &: 
Nov. 1964),8 ATL News L. 304 (Dec. 1964); Easthampton Contributory Retirement 
Board v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board, 347 Mass. 777, 199 N.E.2d 551 
(1964),7 ATL News L. 304 (Dec. 1964); Gracie v. C. E. Halback Co., 23 App. Div. 
2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 352 (3d Dept. 1965), 8 ATL News L. 195 (Aug. 1965); Marko-
witz v. Mack Markowitz, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 1001, 255 N.Y.S.2d 28 (3d Dept. 1964), 
i! ATL News L. 150 (June, 1965); Post v. Wallauer Paint Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 981, 
254 N.Y.S.2d 720 (3d Dept. 1964), 8 ATL News L. 195 (Aug. 1965); Hamilton v. 
Transport Workers Union, 21 App. Div. 2d 434, 251 N.Y.S.2d 104 (3d Dept. 1964), 8 
ATL News L. 26 (Feb. 1965); Woodworth v. County of Orondago Sheriff's Dept., 
20 App. Div. 2d 945, 249 N.Y.S.2d 239 (3d Dept. 1964), 7 ATL News L. 305 (Dec. 
1964); Goodwin v. New York State WOrkmen's Compensation Board, 20 App. Div. 2d 
951, 249 N.Y.S.2d 63 (3d Dept. 1964), 8 ATL News L. 26 (Feb. 1965); H. J. Jeffries 
Truck Lines v. Grisham, 397 P.2d 637 (Okla. 1964),8 ATL News L. 196 (Aug. 1965); 
Lea Machinery Co. v. Emmons, 395 P.2d 857 (Okla. 1964), 8 ATL News L. 63 
(March, 1965). 
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Under General Laws, Chapter 152, Section 18, the insurer of an 
employer may be responsible to the employer's employee for injuries 
sustained while working at the behest of a subcontractor or indepen-
dent contractor who can be considered a common employer with the 
insured. The insurer is entitled to recover from the noninsured em-
ployer the damages it has sustained. However, it can recover no more 
than what it has actually paid out to the employee, for if this subcon-
tractor or second employer is considered a common employer for the 
purposes of this section of the statute, it is not a party other than the 
insured under Section 15 of General Laws, Chapter 152. 
Whether the defendant was a common employer with the insured 
prime employer was the question raised in Carr v. Arthur D. Little, 
Inc.1 The decision does not hinge on an interpretation of law, but an 
interpretation of the facts. Were the facts sufficient to sustain a jury 
finding that the defendant and the prime employer, Tech Welding 
Corp. (Tech), were not common employers? 
The defendant was engaged in industrial engineering. Tech was a 
metal fabricator. A third party contracted to purchase from the defen-
dant a vessel for the purpose of testing pumps under exposure to liquid 
oxygen which Little was going to design, fabricate, and test for per-
formance. The project was under the direction of one of the defendant's 
employees. Tech and the defendant entered into an oral agreement 
whereby Tech would manufacture a part of this container. The oral 
contract was subsequently confirmed by written orders. Tech was not 
equipped to test this product completely; therefore, it was agreed that 
the defendant would do this testing, but at Tech's plant. Tech agreed 
to this arrangement only on the promise that the defendant would not 
interfere with Tech's regular work schedule. When the test did not 
proceed properly, the defendant's employees consulted Tech's em-
ployee, Carr, the shop foreman. Carr had over-all supervision of the 
entire shop, which at the time was working on numerous other projects 
as well as on the one for defendant. Any work done on the defendant's 
project was done as an incident of Carr's general duties as shop fore-
man. This testing arrangement between defendant and Tech was for-
mulated after the contract terms had been completed and most of the 
work had been finished. 
The Supreme Judicial Court agreed that it was possible to find, based 
on these facts, that the testing process during which Carr sustained his 
injuries was not part of the work actually being done by Tech. There-
fore, the defendant would not be a common employer with Tech. The 
defendant was working on something totally unrelated to Tech's re-
sponsibilities and was merely using Tech's facilities. The defendant 
Little, therefore, not being a common employer under Section 18, an 
action at law as provided for under General Laws, Chapter 152, Sec-
tion 15, could be successfully maintained.2 
§18.6. 1 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 213, 204 N.E.2d 466. 
2 Other cases discussing the question of whether two employers were common 
employers are Abbott v. Link-Belt Co., 324 Mass. 673, 88 N.E.2d 551 (1949); DuBois 
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§18.7. Successive insurers. In Casey's Casel the basic controversy 
centered on which of two insurers should pay an employee's disability 
compensation. While working for employer number one, which was 
insured by Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, the claimant 
sustained severe back injuries which resulted in extensive medical 
treatment and loss of wages. The employee returned to his work where 
he remained for approximately two and one-half months after which he 
went on his annual two-week vacation. When he returned from his 
vacation, it was found there was no work available for him in the de-
partment in which he had been working prior to the accident. He had 
been assembling playpens. He was, therefore, transferred to another 
job which required him to bend and lift table tops weighing fifteen to 
twenty pounds. Within a week he had a recurrence of the back trouble 
caused by the original injury and had to leave work. At the time this 
case was heard, he had not yet been able to return to work. His em-
ployer was insured for workmen's compensation by American Motor-
ists Insurance Company at the time the claimant's back trouble re-
curred. 
The question was, should American or Hartford pay the compensa-
tion? The Industrial Accident Board had found American responsible. 
"Only one insurer can be charged for the same disability, and where 
there are several successive insurers, chargeability for the whole com-
pensation rests upon the one covering the risk at the time of the most 
recent injury that bears a causal relation to the disability."2 
The actual problem is one of evidence. Was there sufficient evidence 
to sustain the decision of the Board that the injury was causally related 
to the second job? The Court found there was not, as it was requisite 
that the employee in such cases present expert medical testimony. The 
Board could not come to any conclusions as to the medical questions 
based on their own knowledge in such an area of expertise. While the 
employee did present an expert, the testimony of one of the treating 
physicians indicated that the second job had done little to aggravate 
the pre-existing condition significantly. There being no additional 
medical evidence, the Court refused to sustain the Board's award and 
recommitted the case for further proceedings. 
§18.8. Court costs. Garnhum's Case,l discussed above in reference 
to an earlier opinion in the case,2 was before the Court for a second 
time. In the previous case, the Court had awarded an employee double 
v. Soule Mill, 323 Mass. 472, 82 N.E.2d 886 (1948); Cannon v. Crowley, 318 Mass. 
373, 61 N.E.2d 662 (1945); Caton v. Winslow Bros. &: Smith Co., 309 Mass. 150, 34 
N.E.2d 638 (1941); Meehan v. Bordon, 307 Mass. 59, 29 N.E.2d 759 (1940). 
§18.7. 1 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 333, 204 N.E.2d 710. 
2Id. at 334-335, 204 N.E.2d at 711. See also McConolouge's Case, 336 Mass. 396, 
145 N.E.2d 831 (1957), noted in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §20.3; Costa's Case, 333 
Mass. 286, 130 N.E.2d 589 (1955); Evans's Case, 299 Mass. 435, 13 N.E.2d 27 (1938). 
§18.8. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1107, 209 N.E.2d 183. 
2 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1223, 202 N.E.2d 255, noted in §18.2 supra. 
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compensation under the provisions of General Laws, Chapter 152, Sec-
tion 28. Following this decision, the attorney for the employee filed in 
the county court a motion for costs under General Laws, Chapter 152, 
Section IIA, requesting an order that either the insurance company 
or the employer pay the costs. A single justice ordered that the attor-
ney's fees and related costs be borne by the insurer, to be reimbursed by 
the employer. From this decision, both the insurer and the employer 
appealed. 
The relevant statute, Section I1A, provides that the employee-claim-
ant may, if he prevails in an appeal to the Superior Court, be awarded, 
in addition to the actual recovery, an amount, "sufficient to relieve the 
employee of the reasonable cost of attorney's fees, briefs and other 
necessary expenses that result from the certification or appeal." The 
statute goes on to provide: 
If any party in interest presents certified copies to the superior 
court ... under the provisions of section eleven for the purpose 
of enforcing decisions of the board or a member made in his favor, 
the court shall likewise allow such party the fees, briefs and ex-
penses provided for by this section. 
Apparently, the employee filed the above motion, but did not present 
the certified copies to the Superior Court as required by Section II. It 
appears that the contention of the insurer and the employer was that 
the failure of the claimant to have done so precluded him from recov-
ering the expenses of the appeal. 
The Court found that there was no reason why the employee had to 
present the certified copies. 
[T]his would have been a bootless duplication of effort and ex-
pense once the same act had been performed by the employer. 
We think that the statute is not to be given this unreasonable in-
terpretation. We agree that the statute could have been more 
clearly expressed, but we are of the opinion that in cases of serious 
and wilful misconduct which has been held to be "conduct of a 
quasi criminal nature" the Legislature could not have intended to 
establish a lower standard of costs for the claimant. 
The second sentence of §IIA is not to be construed as depriving 
the employee of costs before the single justice or the full bench. 
The reference in it to "the court" must be taken to refer to the 
courts enumerated in the first sentence of §1lA.3 
The Court also had to determine whether the employer or the insurer 
should bear the burden of these costs. As discussed above,4o under Gen-
eral Laws, Chapter 152, Section 28, the employer has the right to enter 
the case as an active defendant if the claim is for double compensation, 
as the employer must reimburse the insurer for the extra compensation 
paid to the employee. Although this section of the statute provides for 
31965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1107, 1109, 209 N.E.2d 18!!, 184. 
4 See §18.2 supra. 
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the employer's right to participate and, in the case of loss, to repay the 
insurer the extra compensation paid to employee, it says nothing about 
costs of the appeal as provided for in Section 11A. The Court held that 
while costs could not be termed extra compensation, the ultimate finan-
cial responsibility for the appeal should rest with the employer. It was 
only his interests which were in question on the appeal. The insurer 
had previously agreed to pay the usual compensation award. Inasmuch 
as the appeal came from the employer, and inasmuch as workmen's 
compensation is governed by equity, "costs should fall upon the party 
causing the 10ss."11 
§18.9. Excess recovery. The final case for consideration in this 
chapter is Richard v. Arsenault.1 In this case the claimant was riding 
in a railroad train, being transferred by his employer, a contractor, from 
one job to another, when the train collided with a trailer truck oper-
ated by the defendant, Joseph Arsenault, and owned by the defendant, 
Cushman Bakery. The employee suffered severe injuries. 
The employer's insurer, Travelers, paid the employee compensation. 
Under the provisions of General Laws, Chapter 152, Section 15, the 
employee then brought a third party action against Cushman and 
Arsenault, Travelers having declined to bring this action within the 
nine months provided for in Section 15. 
The employee was awarded an additional judgment. The question 
under review was what to do with the excess. The employee may be 
entitled to additional benefits from Travelers under workmen's com-
pensation at a subsequent time, although he is now back on the job. 
If he should receive further compensation, it would appear that the 
carrier would be entitled to a setoff based on the common law recovery. 
Section 15 provides for the employee's right to bring a common law 
action, under certain circumstances, against a third party. It also ad-
heres to the general workmen's compensation principle that the em-
ployee should not receive double compensation for an injury except in 
limited situations. Therefore, should a recovery be made, the insurer 
who has already paid the employee must be reimbursed to the extent 
that he has so paid the employee, only the excess going to the employee. 
This is settled procedure. Complicating the Richard case, however, was 
the possibility that future compensation might be owed by the em-
ployer to the employee. If all the excess were given to the employee, 
and he later received additional compensation, he has had a windfall. 
If, on the other hand, once an excess recovery is assessed against a third 
party the employee is precluded from additional compensation, this 
might deprive him of full recovery if the excess were less than the 
amount of additional compensation he subsequently might receive. To 
give all the excess under these circumstances to the employer might 
result in his unjustified enrichment, should there be no subsequent 
award to the employee or the subsequent award be less than the as-
111965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1107, 1110, 209 N.E.2d 1BlI, 1B4. 
§lB.9. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 11611, 209 N.E.2d liM. 
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sessed recovery achieved against the third party. To leave the money in 
escrow, subject to a final determination of the workmen's compensation 
case, could deprive the employee of needed funds for a long and indef-
inite period of time. The Court, therefore, reached the most equitable 
result, giving the employee the excess, but providing that it was to be 
set off against any future compensation payments. 
The Court also had to determine whether the excess could at this 
juncture be determined, as there was a possibility that the employee 
might receive further compensation. The Court held that the excess 
could be determined on the basis of the insurer's previously paid-out 
compensation. The insurer would be protected by the Court's decision 
that any excess retained ~y the employee would be set off against future 
payments. This all seems to make good sense. 
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